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Abstract
Cellular phones contain a wealth of data useful to forensic investigators. Much of this
data is stored within the hardware of the phone itself, but other data is often contained in
a small card-like device called a subscriber identity module (SIM). SIMs are often locked
with a PIN code that prevents access to the data unless the correct password is entered. If
an invalid PIN is entered several times, the card locks and may even destroy its stored data.
This presents a challenge to the retrieval of forensic data from the SIM when the PIN is
unknown.
The field of side-channel analysis (SCA) collects, identifies, and processes informa-
tion leaked via inadvertent channels. One promising side-channel leakage is that of elec-
tromagnetic (EM) emanations; by carefully monitoring the SIM’s emissions, it may be
possible to identify specific operations being performed by the internal microprocessor,
and thus, determine the correct PIN to unlock the card.
This thesis uses EM SCA techniques to attempt to discover the SIM card’s PIN. The
tested SIM is subjected to simple and differential electromagnetic analysis. No clear data
dependency or correlation is apparent. The SIM does reveal information pertaining to its
validation routine, but the value of the card’s stored PIN does not appear to have an effect
on EM leakage, and thus the PIN cannot be determined. The two factors contributing to
this result are the black-box nature of PIN validation and the hardware and software SCA
countermeasures. Further experimentation on SIMs with known operational characteristics
could be used to reveal data dependencies and countermeasure effects, determining the
viability of future SCA attacks on these devices.
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SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS OF SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY MODULES
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The field of side-channel analysis (SCA) collects, identifies, and processes informa-
tion unintentionally leaked through inadvertent channels in software, systems, and devices.
Examples of common side channels include the completion time for a task or process, the
amount of power consumed by a device during an operation, and electromagnetic emana-
tions from a semiconductor device. Each of these side channels is capable of revealing
protected information to an attacker, details about the system’s operation, or a combination
of the two. Leaking a password or encryption key via a side channel can grant an attacker
access to the rest of the system through its intended channels.
This research applies side-channel analysis to subscriber identity modules, or SIM
cards. A SIM holds a cellular network subscriber’s identity, which is used to authenticate
the user to the network. In addition, the SIM may contain various types of user data
useful to forensic investigators, such as phonebook entries, text messages, and location
information. This information is often protected with a Personal Identification Number
(PIN) to prevent unauthorized access. Because of the SIM’s role in network authorization,
considerable research has been directed toward making it a highly secure device. Although
the PIN is typically a simple four-digit numeric code, its security is enhanced by a retry
counter that locks the card if an incorrect PIN is entered three times, ruling out the
possibility for a brute-force attack.
This security measure blocks unauthorized access to the SIM’s data through the
primary channel, and a SIM card does not have any alternate primary channels available.
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As such, an attacker must locate a side channel to extract the PIN in order to obtain the
forensic data.
1.2 Goals and Limitations
This research examines the possibility of exploiting PIN leakage through the
electromagnetic side channel. A methodology for attacking the PIN via electromagnetic
analysis is presented with multiple capture methods to increase the probability of success.
Both simple and differential electromagnetic attacks are shown. The ultimate goal is to
produce a working attack that recovers the PIN. Barring complete success, other goals
include the examination of electromagnetic attacks against modern SIMs and evaluating
the effects of countermeasure implementations, as current research against SIM card
PINs is rather limited. However, design secrecy of SIM countermeasures prevents a full
understanding of which countermeasures to expect and in what form to expect them.
Research limitations include the number of SIMs available, limitations in the
collection hardware and interfacing device, and details about the device’s internal
architecture. This research is not intended as an exhaustive search of all electromagnetic
attacks on all smart cards. Only a select few of each are chosen, and the research focuses
specifically on Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards. Even though much of this research
is applicable to other forms of smart cards, they are not considered here.
1.3 Thesis Layout
This document is divided into the following chapters. The second chapter, following
this introduction, covers the background of SIM cards and the development of the side
channel analysis field. It also presents countermeasures in SIM cards designed to frustrate
attempts at side channel analysis attacks. Chapter three outlines a research methodology
to execute an electromagnetic analysis attack against the SIM card’s PIN. Chapter four
records the results of that attack and evaluates its effectiveness. The final chapter points
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toward future work opportunities to carry out further evaluation of such attacks against
SIM card PINs.
3
II. Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces subscriber identity modules (SIMs), side channel analysis, and
the interaction between the two. Section 2.2 presents the module itself and a description
of the forensic data contained therein. It also discusses the module’s architecture and the
security features in place to protect the card from unauthorized access and use. Section
2.3 describes the field of side-channel analysis and discusses important historical attacks
and their development. Section 2.4 notes previous research where side-channel analysis
is applied to smart cards and SIMs. Finally, Section 2.5 describes countermeasures
implemented on SIMs to protect against side-channel analysis and what effect these
features are expected to have on attacks.
2.2 Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Overview
2.2.1 Introduction to SIMs.
Subscriber identity modules (SIMs) are small, card-like devices used in mobile phones
to identify and authenticate the user to the network. They perform this task based on strong
cryptographic algorithms and keys contained within the card. In addition to network-based
identity information, the SIM also contains personal data relevant to the user, such as
text messages, recently dialed numbers, and location information. Both authentication
and personal data is protected by a Personal Identification Number (PIN), a four-digit
numeric code. This PIN, known to the subscriber, is protected against brute force attacks
by enforcing a three-strike lockout policy. If the PIN is entered incorrectly three times in a
row, the SIM locks down and can no longer be unlocked by the PIN. Instead, a Pin Unlock
Key (PUK) must be obtained, usually from the carrier, to unlock the card. This key is
typically a six- or eight-digit code protected by a similar lockout policy, this time with a
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ten-attempt limit. If this limit is reached, the card becomes permanently locked and must
be discarded.
2.2.2 Forensic Interest.
SIM cards contain a wealth of information useful to forensic investigators [4]. While
some of this data is accessible without authentication, much of it is in protected files and
thus cannot be retreived without first entering a valid PIN. If a SIM is recovered while
attached to a phone or mobile device, the PIN may be saved in the device and thus be
retrieved by other means. However, in the case of SIMs recovered independent of a device,
the PIN must first be obtained before accessing much of this data.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Systems and Network
Security group divides available SIM forensic data into four categories ([27], [28]). A
description of data available under each category follows.
2.2.2.1 Service-related information.
The first category is service-related information. This information is used to determine
which network (or networks) the card connects to. The two identifiers of interest are the
integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID) and the international mobile subscriber identity
(IMSI). These numbers identify the SIM and the subscriber to the cellular service provider
for authentication and billing purposes. The ICCID represents the card’s unique serial
number and cannot be changed. The ICCID is accessible without a PIN and is also typically
imprinted on the card itself. The IMSI uniquely identifies the subscriber and includes
fields for a country code, network code, and account number. Unlike the ICCID, the IMSI
requires PIN entry for access. Additionally, the IMSI may be changed by the provider.
2.2.2.2 Phonebook and call information.
The second category, phonebook and call information, focuses on telephone numbers
stored in the SIM. The two primary files used for phone number storage are the Abbreviated
Dialing Numbers (ADN) and Last Numbers Dialed (LND) files. The ADN file contains
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standard phonebook-style name-number pairs for easy retrieval and dialing. The LND file
is used to record recent numbers dialed by the mobile device (regardless of whether the
call was successful). Phones and devices are not required to use these files, however; many
phones store phonebook and recent call information in internal device memory instead of
on the SIM [51].
2.2.2.3 Messaging information.
The third type of forensic data contained within a SIM is messaging information. Short
Message Service (SMS) messages are often saved to the SIM for later reference or retrieval.
Both sent and received messages may be catalogued in the SMS file. Deleted messages
may also be retrieved if they are only marked as deleted rather than being overwritten [28].
In addition to message text, message metadata is also stored, including timestamp and
source/destination number. As with phonebook information, some or all of the SMS data
may be stored in the phone’s internal memory rather than the SIM. However, if present, it
remains useful forensic evidence.
2.2.2.4 Location information.
Finally, SIMs contain location information within the Location Information (LOCI)
file. At a high level, this file records the Location Area Code (LAC) for the group
of network towers (called cells) with which the phone last communicated. These cell
groupings are geographically based; thus, the LAC can be used to roughly identify the
location where the device was last powered on and connected to a network.
2.2.3 Platform Implementation.
2.2.3.1 Platform overview.
Modern SIMs are complete embedded computer systems on a single chip. The
typical SIM system includes a central processing unit (CPU), a cryptography processor,
random-access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), a strong random number
generator (RNG), a communications interface, a clock generator, a power supply, and
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busses connecting these components together. Note that ROM is often not truly read-only;
in SIMs, it often takes the form of flash or electrically erasable programmable read-only
memory (EEPROM), both of which can be erased and re-programmed. A block diagram
of an example smart card processor (the Infineon SLE66) is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: SLE66 security controller block diagram [23]
The complete system can be referred to as a system-on-chip (SoC) or microcontroller.
While individual components such as the CPU, cryptography processor, or communications
interface are discussed here as separate modules, it is important to note that they are all
contained within a single semiconductor device.
2.2.3.2 Processor.
Early SIMs as well as modern low-end devices feature an 8-bit CPU. The Infineon
SLE44 and SLE66 smart card controllers, for example, use an optimized derivative of the
8051 core with extensions to run some 16-bit instructions. [37]. Mid-range platforms such
as the SLE76 use a true 16-bit platform, and the high-end SLE88 uses a 32-bit processor
[25]. Other manufacturers such as NXP, Atmel, Samsung, and STMicrosystems have
similar product lineups.
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The CPU operates at clock rates from 3.57 MHz up to 66 MHz, depending on the
model. A reference clock signal is generated by the host (i.e., the phone) and supplied to the
SIM via an external clock input pin. The SIM receives this signal and uses a phase-locked
loop (PLL) to multiply the clock to the required frequencies for the CPU, communications
interface, and real-time clock (if present) [46]. The SIM may elect to stop or vary the
frequency of these internal clocks in order to save power during inactive periods.
In addition to the main CPU, cryptography processors are used to provide hardware
implementations of necessary cryptographic algorithms needed for the SIM’s security
functions. Most devices include the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithms, and high-end SIMs include Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) implementations as well. By oﬄoading complex encryption work to this
cryptography processor, the CPU is free to use its limited processing power for other tasks.
Also, from a hardware security standpoint, it is easier to protect specific operations of a
dedicated cryptographic device than it is to protect an entire general-purpose CPU.
2.2.3.3 Operating system.
The SIM operating system (OS) is different for every manufacturer, but most SIMs
adhere to a specification called Java Card. The specification is maintained in the form
of an international standard [11] as well as an application programming interface (API)
by Oracle [42]. A Java Card-compatible OS is an application-based system that allows
manufacturers, carriers, and other developers to quickly design applications that function
on any SIM adhering to the standard. These applications are written in a subset of the Java
programming language. As with Java on personal computers (PCs), a completed Java Card
application is compiled into bytecode that runs on the Java virtual machine (JVM) provided
by the host platform. Java Card-compatible bytecode is very similar to full Java bytecode,
but is optimized for size, as Java Card platforms are often very limited in terms of available
RAM and ROM.
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Figure 2.2: Java Card architecture and runtime environment [43]
The primary Java application running in the SIM’s operating system is called USIM
[50]. This application provides an interface for communication with the SIM and maintains
the file system hierarchy. This hierarchy includes levels such as the master file (MF) and
application dedicated file (ADF) as well as two file types, the elementary file (EF) and
dedicated file (DF). These files contain a wealth of information related to the SIM, the
phone, the network, and the user [5]. Data stored in these files includes the network
encryption keys and certificates, user identity numbers, PIN codes, phonebook entries, text
messages, and more; essentially all data retrievable from the SIM is accessed via one of
these files. Each file has attributes that specify what privilege level is necessary to access
the file [39].
2.2.4 Communication and Interfacing.
The SIM interface is a set of six contact pads on one side of the module, five of which
are actually used. When the SIM is inserted into a device, spring contacts press against
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these pads to form the electrical connections. This contact interface is standardized in [26]
and is shown in Figure 2.3.
C1–VCC
C2–RST
C3–CLK
C4–      
C5–GND
C6–VPP
C7–I/O
C8–    
Figure 2.3: Smart card pin-out [7]
The power (VCC) and ground (GND) pads supply 3.3V power to the SIM. The clock
(CLK) pad is an input for the SIM’s reference clock, as the modules do not typically have
an on-board oscillator. This is usually a 3.57 MHz input, however, some SIMs support
faster clock rates. The reset (RST) pad is a standard CPU reset signal that controls the
processor’s operation. Finally, the I/O pad is the SIM’s communication interface. This
single pin provides an asynchronous serial port and is the only interface through which all
communication to and from the card must take place. The programming (VPP) pad is used
for manufacturer-specific flash programming.
When power is first applied to the card and the reset signal is de-asserted, the SIM
sends an answer to reset (ATR). The ATR contains up to 33 bytes of card parameters,
including maximum clock rate, communication baud rate, and protocol selection [26].
Apart from the ATR, all communication with the SIM takes place over one of two
standardized protocols. These protocols are called T=0 and T=1.
In both protocols, communication between the USIM application and the host (phone)
takes place in the form of messages called Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs). The
T=0 protocol simply requires APDUs to be sent in a command-response sequence. While
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the T=1 protocol also uses APDUs to hold data, it is a complex multi-layer networking-type
protocol that will not be described here.
APDUs are either commands or responses. A command APDU contains the following
fields:
• CLA: a one-byte field indicating whether the rest of the command follows the
standard format or a proprietary format
• INS: a one-byte instruction opcode indicating which command should be executed
• P1, P2: two bytes containing arguments or parameters for the selected command
• Lc: 0-3 bytes defining the length in bytes of data to follow
• Data: Freeform data with length as described in Lc
• Le: 0-3 bytes defining the length in bytes of the expected response APDU
A response APDU contains only two fields:
• Response: freeform data with length as described by the received command APDU
• SW1, SW2: status of the requested command, i.e., success or failure (SW = “status
word”)
Examples of commonly used commands (specified by the INS field) include “select
record,” “get data,” “put data,” and “verify CHV”. The last command is particularly of
interest to this research: it is used to validate the PIN.
2.2.5 Security Features.
One of the primary purposes of the SIM is to provide security - Infineon even calls
their smart card microcontrollers “security controllers.” By necessity, then, SIM devices
must have built-in security mechanisms to protect the secrets contained within the card. A
brief overview of SIM-based authentication and encryption follows [3].
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2.2.5.1 Protecting the keys.
In a mobile phone application using second-generation (2G) Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) or third-generation (3G) Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) networks, a challenge-response process is used to authenticate. The phone
first sends identity information found on the SIM in the form of the ICCID and/or IMSI.
The network provider’s backend systems use this identity to locate the subscriber’s record
in a database and retrieve the subscriber’s individual shared secret key.
Next, a random number is generated to form the challenge. This number is encrypted
with the shared secret key to calculate the expected response. The challenge is then
transmitted to the phone, which in turn presents it to the SIM. The SIM also contains
the shared secret key (pre-loaded prior to sale by the provider) and uses it to calculate the
response, which is transmitted back to the network provider for verification.
Once authenticated, the randomly-generated number as well as the shared secret
are used to calculate a session key that is used in ongoing encryption of over-the-air
communication for the rest of the session. While the session encryption itself is performed
by the phone, the key calculation process is performed by the SIM.
Even with this simplification of the network security process, the need to protect the
shared secret key is immediately apparent. This shared key (called the Ki) can be loaded
into the card but not retrieved [13], and the SIM never transmits it to the host device.
Exfiltration of the key would allow theft of service, identity spoofing, and eavesdropping.
It could also allow multiple devices to use the same account.
Due to this dual concern of both the customer’s privacy and security as well as the
provider’s billing integrity, it is in the best interest of the provider to select a high-security
SIM card platform. As a result, even low-cost SIMs are designed with security in mind.
At a high level, the closed nature of the SIM system enhances security. While a
personal computer allows custom application execution, network connectivity, and direct
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access to storage, the SIM has a much simpler interface to its surroundings. All com-
munication to the SIM must take place over its universal asynchronous receiver/transmit-
ter (UART) interface via a defined set of commands. Arbitrary application code cannot be
executed by the user, and a PIN-locked card blocks all but the most basic status commands.
2.2.5.2 Software-based protection.
The SIM file system, as described earlier, has security attributes to prevent
unprivileged users or code from accessing critical files such as those containing the PINs
or the Ki. Privilege levels protect these files on an operating-system level, and the virtual
machine-based nature of the Java language prevents bypassing these restrictions with raw
memory access.
Even the specifics of the algorithms used to perform GSM authentication and
encryption were kept secret until they were reverse engineered by Marc Briceno in 1999
[6], revealing weaknesses in the algorithm’s implementation that allowed for easier SIM
identity cloning. Modern algorithms used for UMTS and Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
networks are standardized and published [12], revealing implementation details for the
presumed benefit of stronger cryptography.
Unfortunately, PIN authentication algorithms are not published, as from the standard’s
perspective, the SIM needs only to validate the PIN as supplied in plain text. Any
encryption or obfuscation of the PIN in storage or validation is up to the SIM manufacturer
or integrator. While weaknesses may exist in any particular implementation, the “black
box” nature of this component makes vulnerability analysis difficult.
2.2.5.3 Hardware-based protection.
In addition to protecting against software- and cryptography-based attacks, the
hardware itself is protected against access and manipulation. A full-size embedded or
desktop computer has accessible busses on which data flowing between the CPU, RAM,
and storage can be observed. Generally speaking, any data processed by the CPU must
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pass over this bus and is thus vulnerable to observation. Andrew Huang famously used this
technique to obtain the code signing key from the Microsoft Xbox gaming console in 2003
[22].
As embedded computing platforms, it follows that SIMs should be vulnerable in the
same way, and strictly speaking, they are. However, unlike a discrete embedded platform
where the 16 or 32 physical bus tracks on the circuit board may occupy 2 cm2 or more,
the die containing the entire SIM system (busses, processors, memory, etc.) may occupy
4 mm2 or less. This tiny die is also surrounded by an encapsulating compound that must
be removed with fuming nitric acid or a similar caustic chemical. Once the die is bare,
the problem of extreme miniaturization can be mitigated with the use of a focused ion
beam (FIB) workstation, but the process is costly and prone to error [46]. Christopher
Tarnovsky of Flylogic Engineering notes in [52] that gaining access to the bus of the
Infineon SLE66 controller was a nine-month process. Several chips and probes were
destroyed in the process, and the use of the FIB equipment cost as much as $350 per hour.
However, despite the difficulty, any well-equipped FIB lab is eventually able to repeat
this process reliably; if the chip is successfully decapsulated, the bus may be read while
the device is running (if possible), or the storage memory/ROM can be powered up and
read out independently. A simple protection mechanism to discourage a probing attack is
to place a fine mesh on the topmost metal layer of the chip. This mesh may have one or
more “channels” of fine traces blocking access to the circuitry below. If power is applied
to the SIM after cutting or removing the mesh, the device’s security mechanism can either
put the SIM into a temporarily disabled state or cause the device to permanently erase its
memory [16]. An example of a simple single-channel mesh design is shown in Figure 2.4.
While it is exceedingly difficult, tedious work with a FIB workstation can remove
these meshes and attach fine wires to bypass their security mechanisms [52]. Therefore,
the chip must therefore be further protected given the assumption that busses are somewhat
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Figure 2.4: ST16601 simple single-channel mesh design [15]
freely accessible. One simple obfuscation is bus scrambling. Outgoing bus lines from the
CPU are fed into a matrix, and all but one connection for each bus line are laser-cut in a
random configuration at the time of manufacture. The result is that the bus lines for any
given SIM are randomly scrambled, and two seemingly identical SIMs are unlikely to have
identical bus configurations. While simply an obfuscation, this can slow down a probe-
based attack and may have implications for the electromagnetic signature of the device as
well [46].
Another bus protection mechanism is bus encryption. By placing a memory encryption
device between the CPU and its peripherals, the code and data passed on the bus and
stored in RAM and ROM are encrypted [24]. This prevents a bus-snooping attacker from
determining the operations of the SIM even if the aforementioned scrambling is defeated.
Additionally, this encryption can be performed with a unique key for each SIM device,
causing identical bus traffic to appear dissimilar between individual SIMs.
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Other physical attacks include optical fault injection attacks and glitching. Optical
fault injection involves decapsulating the chip and using a laser to switch transistors on by
photon bombardment. A well-placed pulse can actually cause bits to flip in such a way
that security measures can be bypassed. Glitching involves continuously or momentarily
operating the SIM at voltages or frequencies just outside its specifications. If unexpected
behavior is introduced, it may be possible to cause the SIM to enter an unlocked state. SIMs
are protected against such attacks through on-die light sensors, voltage sensors, frequency
monitors, and glitch detectors.
Finally, the SIM is protected against more than direct, invasive physical attacks.
Side-channel analysis is a non-invasive, observational attack vector that does not require
decapsulation and FIB probing. Instead, the SIM is operated in standard ways and
the timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic emanations are observed. Careful
measurement of these parameters can reveal details about the operation of the SIM. An
in-depth look at side-channel attacks and countermeasures follows in the next section, but
at a high level, the SIM must include mechanisms that hinder these attacks.
In summary, the SIM is built to be a secure device from the silicon to the software.
Most of the security mechanisms discussed are intended to protect cryptography-related
data and operations, as these components ensure confidentiality and integrity of the user’s
account and network data. However, the side effect – certainly not an accidental one – is
that the SIM’s security-minded design makes it very difficult to extract the PIN and obtain
access to the user’s stored data.
2.3 Side-Channel Analysis (SCA)
2.3.1 SCA Overview.
The term side-channel analysis refers to the analysis of data transmitted or “leaked”
from a device via an unintentional channel. A SIM card, for example, only has one
intentional channel for sending data to its host: the serial port. Higher-end smart cards
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may have an additional Universal Serial Bus (USB) or contactless channel as well. These
interfaces form primary channels, and all data leaving over these channels – whether
authorized or not – is legitimate from a side channel analysis perspective. Information
that leaves the device through anything other than these intentionally defined channels is
said to leak through a side channel. It is important to note that side channel leakages can
include both data that is normally transmitted over a legitimate channel (such as the letters
pressed on a computer keyboard) as well as data that is never transmitted by the device
(such as the GSM Ki). Also, information leaving the device is not purely data; while data
is often the target (such as an encryption key), side channel leakage of a device’s instruction
state is also a vulnerability. One such vulnerability occurs if a side channel leaks the fact
that the device has rejected a password and is about to decrement a retry counter. This
information could allow the hacker to cut power to the device before the counter is written.
Common side channels include operation timing, power consumption, and electro-
magnetic emanations. A brief description of each follows.
2.3.2 Types of SCA.
2.3.2.1 Timing analysis.
One of the earliest and most easily understood side channel attacks is the timing attack.
A timing attack occurs when side channel leakage is obtained by observing the amount of
time an operation takes to occur. An example of this is found in a simple string compare
such as might be used by a password-checking function. The system loads both strings
into memory and sequentially compares each byte. As soon as a comparison fails, the loop
exits and the function returns the result that the strings do not match (or the password
is invalid). However, if every compare succeeds and the end of the string is reached
successfully, the function returns the result that the strings match (or access is granted). The
number of comparisons the function performs before it returns its result is directly related
to the number of matching bytes in the strings. Now, suppose that each byte comparison
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instruction takes 1 microsecond (µs) to complete. Comparing strings in which the first six
bytes match takes 4 µs longer to return than if only the first two bytes match. A password
validator that operates in this way (using a standard string-compare) is guaranteed to be
vulnerable to this simple timing attack, as a brute-forcing attacker is given information
about his progress that drastically reduces the password search space.
Paul Kocher in [35] is generally cited as the earliest published demonstrator of a
timing attack on cryptosystems. Kocher bases his attack on the fact that computationally
expensive cryptographic functions often run in variable amounts of time. In the simplest
case, he demonstrates the attack on the binary modular exponentiation method. This is
a repetitive algorithm that, in each iteration through its loop, either performs or skips a
modulus operation based on the value of each bit in the input. The bit value that causes the
modulus to execute takes more time than the value that causes the skip. Thus, by trial and
error, an attacker can eventually figure out the entire value. Kocher goes on to explain how
this principle can be applied to various cryptosystems such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman.
Kocher’s ideas are used by Dhem et al. [10] to create a working attack against RSA
in early smart cards, resulting in a modification of the implementation in that particular
smart card standard. As a “practical” attack, this paper shows that timing attacks are a true
concern in cryptosystems and not simply a theoretical danger. It is noted that the attack
fails against RSA implementations using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, but Schindler
in [48] provides a timing attack that solves this problem and is even more efficient than the
original attack.
2.3.2.2 Power analysis.
Power analysis attacks are another means of side-channel analysis. Power analysis
relies on the fact that current flows across transistor junctions when a given transistor
enters a switched-on state. Thus, the device’s operation is observable through changes
in the overall current draw: each transistor in the on-state increases the required current,
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and transistors in the off-state have the opposite effect. Small current consumption
changes like these create detailed pictures of low-level data, instruction, and execution
processes occurring inside the device. Additionally, as different modules of a complex
microcontroller switch on and off, observed patterns and changes in a higher-level
“zoomed-out” view of the power consumption trace shows the large-scale operations over
time [31].
Power analysis requires that the current draw of a device be measured. This is
achieved by placing a small-valued resistor in line with the device’s power input (either
on the voltage or ground line). The voltage drop across the resistor is then measured via
a traditional oscilloscope probe and Ohm’s law is used to convert this voltage to current
(I = ∆V/R). As the process requires the cutting of a trace or wire, this “power tap” is
considered invasive but does not require extensive modification.
As with timing analysis attacks, Kocher et al. provide the earliest studies on
power analysis attacks ([33], [34]). He divides power analysis attacks into two types:
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Simple power
analysis refers to cases where the power consumption trace exhibits a high-level instruction
dependency, that is, the data fed into an algorithm determines the execution path. The
application of SPA is very similar to that of timing attacks in that decisions in the
algorithm’s flow (such as a conditional branch) cause information about the protected data
or key to leak. The paper shows how the sixteen rounds of a DES operation is easily
identified by its repetitive pattern of power consumption. It also notes a few conditional
branches that make DES susceptible to SPA.
Differential power analysis is used when simple power analysis is insufficient to
extract the required data from the device. Unlike SPA, where a single trace or a small
number of averaged traces demonstrate a clear representation of the data or operations, DPA
requires larger numbers of traces (1,000, 10,000, 100,000, or more). Statistical analyses are
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then conducted on the data in conjunction with generated intermediate data for many key
guesses. Averaging is performed across the traces and a classification is given to each trace
for each key guess. The correlation value is calculated for each guess and the guessed key
with the highest correlation – the DPA peak – is chosen to be correct. This type of attack
does not require knowledge of the implementation but does require some knowledge of the
algorithm in place [1].
Kocher’s introductory DPA work is largely theoretical, but more practical attacks
appear in [32]. Specifically, attacks against DES and RC4 are shown. In addition, the use of
Hamming weights as a side-channel goal is introduced. The Hamming weight of a number
is simply the sum of the set bits: for example, the Hamming weight of 4 (0100) is 1, and
the Hamming weight of 7 (0111) is 3. The number of set bits directly correlates to power
consumption and provides a useful tool in DPA. While an attack providing the Hamming
weight of all or part of the key does not completely “crack” the given encryption, it can
substantially reduce the keyspace and allows for smaller and more manageable collections.
Hamming weights are also usable as a DPA subkey power model [31].
In addition to data leakage, power analysis also provides a means of observing
hardware states in order to exploit a device. For example, a SIM card must maintain a
retry counter to allow only three invalid PIN attempts before locking to the PUK. A naı¨ve
implementation of this function (used in early smart cards [46]) decrements the counter
each time an attempt fails, locking the card when the counter reaches zero. However, the
hardware implementation provides advance warning that this decrement is about to occur.
The PIN retry counter must be stored in non-volatile memory in order to persist. The
types of non-volatile memory used in SIMs include EEPROM and, more recently, flash
memory, both of which draw an increased amount of power when entering a write cycle.
By watching for the leading edge of this power spike and immediately cutting power to the
SIM, the counter is never updated and the PIN is breakable by a simple brute-force attack.
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2.3.2.3 Electromagnetic analysis.
Electromagnetic analysis provides yet another means of side-channel attack. Instead
of capturing the power consumption of a given device, the electromagnetic (EM)
emanations are measured. Complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) devices,
which include most semiconductor devices today, consume power during gate transitions
from high to low levels. Additionally, the act of switching a gate causes a tiny short circuit
and a small spike in current draw as the signal propagates through the gate’s transistors. All
of these changes in flow of power alter the electromagnetic field surrounding the device,
and these changes can be picked up by a special probe.
Capturing EM data requires a near-field probe which contains a simple coil of wire.
This probe is placed very close to the device being analyzed. Current moving within the
device induces small currents in the coil, which are then amplified by an attached low-noise
amplifier (LNA) and captured by an oscilloscope. This captured data is analyzed in much
the same manner as in power analysis attacks, both because electromagnetic emanation is
closely related to power consumption, as well as because the statistical methods used are
effective for both types of analog signals [38].
Electromagnetic analysis has some advantages over power analysis, however. Unlike
DPA, it is a non-invasive attack, eliminating the need to modify the target. Second, the
nature of using a movable probe results in the ability to perform localized captures. In
other words, if the CPU component of the SoC is found to leak the most information, the
probe is positioned directly over that area of the die to obtain the most signal and the least
noise. Power analysis, on the other hand, is limited to the aggregate power consumption
of the entire device. Finally, electromagnetic analysis (EMA) allows the observation of
the charge and discharge cycles of a gate discretely, providing more detail on each gate’s
transitions than power analysis [44]. This allows, for example, a bit’s transition from 1 to 0
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to be more readily distinguished from a 0 to 1 transition, and thus, is a stronger side-channel
leakage.
While Kocher’s DPA papers mention electromagnetic analysis from a theoretical
standpoint, it and other papers shortly following it lack actual experimental results.
Gandolfi et al. in [19] demonstrate some of the first true results of successfully attacking
DES, COMP128, and RSA with EMA. The paper notes the importance of selecting
a physical location on the chip where activity is highest during the desired process, a
methodology also followed by this thesis research. It also provides a detailed comparison
of DPA vs. Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA), the latter term coined along
with Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) by Quisquater et al. to match Kocher’s
DPA and SPA counterparts, respectively [45]. It is worth noting that even though EMA
is found in some cases to be superior to power analysis, DPA statistical techniques are
applicable to EMA attacks [34].
Mulder el al. in [8] show that hardware cryptographic modules – such as those found
in smart cards – introduce another layer of complexity as encryption operations occur in
parallel instead of sequentially. This greatly increases the number of transitions happening
simultaneously, thus muddying the signal and requiring much higher amounts of data to
break. The example 160-bit hardware cryptosystem requires 20 times more collections to
obtain the key than the same system in software on an 8-bit smart card.
Other challenges of EMA include finding an appropriate probe, filtering out
information outside of the desired clock frequency, and locating the area of maximum
leakage. With a high resolution probe, very minor changes in location can select completely
different emanations [9]. Electromagnetic analysis proves effective, but assembling an
attack on a new system is quite a challenge.
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2.4 Side-Channel Analysis Attacks on Subscriber Identity Modules
2.4.1 Attacks on encryption.
The majority of attacks on SIMs focus on acquiring the Ki, and thus attack the
encryption functions of the card rather than the PIN. While acquiring the Ki is not the goal
of this research, methods used in such attacks provide useful information on side-channel
analysis of SIMs and countermeasures present therein.
Prior to attacks on SIMs specifically, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks against
smart cards exist as early as the first year of DPA’s public existence. Since the smart card is
a closed-system cryptography system with widespread use, it is logically one of the devices
most affected by SCA and thus the target of much research. In one of the earliest papers on
the topic, Messerges et al. in [40] demonstrates the vulnerability of simple implementations
of DES to SPA. It also shows the vulnerability of better implementations to DPA given
approximately 1,300 traces with randomly-selected inputs.
DPA is used in [47] to adaptively attack the COMP128 algorithm in a SIM. Initially,
a standard DPA attack is used with 1,000 traces, and DPA is performed against all 256 key
byte hypotheses. This attack fails and further analysis is necessary. Several assumptions
about implementation details provide a reasonable hypothesis for the inner workings of the
implementation, and further classification is used to group the traces based on a variety of
factors until the assumptions are shown to be correct. Random inputs to the device (that is,
having the SIM encrypt random values) can find the key with these methods in only 500
traces. However, an adaptive search increases the attack speed considerably. By taking
a single collection with a single input value and then performing DPA on that data, each
subsequent input value is chosen to quickly restrict the possible outcomes one bit at a time.
Continuing with this approach, the attack consistently succeeds after only eight collections.
The number eight is interesting here as most DPA approaches require well upwards of 100
traces, while eight traces is less than the ten-attempt PUK lockout limit.
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Another COMP128 attack is performed by Novak in [41] based on a vulnerability
in the algorithm’s table lookup. This vulnerability splits the key space in half as the
implementation on an 8-bit processor requires the lookup table be split for indexing. Yet
another DPA-based attack is presented by Zhou et al. in [55]. In both of these cases, and
particularly in the latter, it is observed that the attacks depend on the 8-bit nature of the
controller. However, the carrier phase-out of 8-bit SIMs began in 2003 [55] and has likely
been long completed at the time of this writing ten years later. The use of a 16-bit CPU
entirely removes the need to split the lookup table and, as such, eliminates the possibility
of an attack through these routes.
2.4.2 Attacks on Personal Identification Numbers.
Note in each of these above cases, a relatively large number of encryptions
are performed and some knowledge of the encryption algorithm used is required.
Unfortunately, the high-level implementation of the PIN verification procedure confounds
both of these expectations. First, the SIM lock-out counter only allows the acquisition of
two traces (in the case of the PIN) or nine traces (in the case of the PUK), which does not
allow correlation or clustering to be performed. Second, the algorithmic uncertainty makes
it very difficult to determine intermediate values that may be passing through different parts
of the circuit. The PIN may or may not be encrypted, may or may not be obfuscated, and
may or may not be checked multiple times.
There are very few research papers specifically studying the PIN of SIM cards.
Folkman in [18] identifies DES encryption being used as part of the PIN verification process
on a low-end 8-bit SIM. The SIM appears to have little or no countermeasure protection
aside from the use of encryption, as many identifiable patterns and processes are clearly
visible in captured power traces. The goal of encryption in PIN verification is to obfuscate
exactly where a comparison is failing. Instead of comparing a four-digit PIN byte-by-byte
in the clear, the stored encrypted PIN is compared to an encrypted version of the input PIN.
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Both encryptions may be salted with additional data such as the card’s unique identifier.
When the encrypted values are compared, the position at which they fail should reveal no
information about where the stored and input PINs differed [14].
In this case, however, it appears that the encryption actually introduced a new
vulnerability while attempting to obscure another. The captured power traces clearly show
the rounds of the DES operations, and once these are identified, standard DPA or even SPA
attacks can potentially be used against this data. Unfortunately, the papers cited do not
provide results as to whether or not the attacks were successful; the papers focus on the
reverse engineering of the process more than the recovery of the PIN.
2.5 Countermeasures
2.5.1 Inadvertent countermeasures.
The complex SIM platform provides a number of features that inadvertently hinder
or foil side-channel attacks. Countermeasures discussed in this section are not strictly
countermeasures; rather, they are platform or implementation details that happen to make
the SCA process more difficult.
The first of these is simply identification of the specific make and model of the
SIM at hand. There are many different cards available with many combinations of
security features, cryptography implementations, and even software configurations. While
manufacturers frequently advertise the available features in product briefs and short
datasheets, it is very difficult to identify the features, chipset, or even manufacturer of a
given SIM. SIMs are typically re-marked with a carrier’s custom product number and
cross-references are not available.
Related to this is the lack of understanding of the PIN validation algorithm. This
could be considered both an inadvertent and an intentional countermeasure, as the details
of the algorithm are probably protected for security, but would likely have no reason to be
published even if it was not a security risk.
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One way to identify a SIM is by the pattern formed by the contacts on the bottom
of the card [46]. This pattern is typically unique to the manufacturer and occasionally to
individual models of SIM. Rankl identifies over 400 unique patterns but does not name the
manufacturers associated with each. Still, if evidence is provided that a given card is, for
example, a Gemalto SIM, other Gemalto SIMs can likely be identified by the same pattern.
Such is not usually the case for identifying models or security features, however.
Another inadvertent countermeasure is the use of the Java Card operating system. In
recent versions, the operating system supports multithreading and features a task scheduler
that could potentially interrupt a cryptography operation or SIM verification process in
varying locations such that multiple traces of the same operation appear different. Not
only do the execution interruptions shift the SIM-verification operations around temporally
(which may be bypassed by elastic alignment techniques [54]), but they also introduce
other miscellaneous data that can confuse the correlation process.
2.5.2 Intentional countermeasures.
Smart card manufacturers have been responding to side-channel analysis attacks since
Kocher first published in the late 1990s. ST Microelectronics reassures its customers in a
1998 white paper ([49]) that their smart cards are strongly protected against SPA and DPA
in a number of ways. One of these ways is a simple interrupt system with what ST calls an
unpredictable number generator. The idea is that interrupts set to occur at random intervals
cause unpredictable timing and power consumption fluctuations to discourage attacks. The
paper also mentions a software-adjustable system clock, which can presumably be varied
during critical operations in such a way as to randomize execution times without interrupts.
Finally, the paper includes one of the earlier mentions of “tripwire” capability: if certain
invalid conditions (such as unexpected states, bad opcodes, etc.) are met, the device
is capable of erasing its entire RAM and ROM. While not comprehensive, these early
attempts at avoiding DPA establish a baseline for modern SIM card security features.
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The clock is a key component in countermeasures as it is the heartbeat of the device.
Random clocking as mentioned above is substantially more effective than random software-
based delays, and by clocking the serial port (which requires a fixed clock) independently,
it is not a costly design change ([36]). In addition to the smart card varying the clock on
its own, sensors exist to monitor clock fluctuations outside of this range. If the clock rate
drops excessively low – a technique usable by an attacker to more easily observe transitions
– the device is reset.
Shielding, as discussed in an earlier section, can prevent probing in the case of device
decapsulation [36]. However, a shield or mesh also acts as an electromagnetic shield for
signals emanating from the device. In some cases, lines of this shield are connected to a
random noise generator [53]. This noise generator, in addition to contributing to random
power consumption, generates a constantly varying signal that is received by the side-
channel probe. Unwanted variations such as these confuse the side-channel attack and
prevent reliable correlation. As an active shield, the SIM monitors the signal flowing
through the shield to ensure its presence and shuts down (or even erases) if the shield is
removed. Light sensors act as similar tripwires to prevent exposed dies from operating
and/or laser-based fault injection attacks [46].
Busses in smart cards can easily be scrambled at the time of manufacturing [46]. A
matrix hidden somewhere in the die is used to join address and/or data lines in non-linear
order such that the resulting bus is not plainly understandable. While this feature is intended
as a probing countermeasure, if each SIM uses a different scrambling matrix, this slows
down the potential attacker from readily interpreting instructions or data between SIMs.
An example of this bus scrambling technique is shown in Figure 2.5.
Finally, memory encryption is a common hardware SCA countermeasure. By standing
between the system’s memory and the processor, a memory encryption device prevents
simple interpretation of memory bus leakage [24]. Encryption of these busses and
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Figure 2.5: ST16F48A bus scrambling matrix [36]
cryptography-related registers corrupts expected Hamming weights from appearing and
lessens the information leakage even if electromagnetic emanations are reliably detected
[2].
Not all countermeasures require complex hardware redesigns however. Hundreds
of implementations of DES, COMP128, RSA, and AES exist with various side-channel
countermeasures. Execution times are kept constant by providing identical do-nothing
branches to complement branches that have purposeful operations. Table lookups are
scrambled or performed in obfuscated ways. Unneeded portions of random or scrambled
data are processed to distract analysts.
While not documented explicitly in datasheets, a number of countermeasures are
mentioned in patents by their various manufacturers. A manufacturer’s ownership of
patents does not ascertain their use of a certain countermeasure technology, but a datasheet
bullet point may be correlated with a patent for implementation hints. For example, some
patents mention the PIN specifically, discussing the verification of a fake PIN [29] or
storing a second PIN to encrypt and compare against [30].
28
2.6 Summary
SIM cards are a secure platform for protecting sensitive information. Forensic data
contained therein cannot be easily extracted via intended channels without authorization.
Side-channel analysis is a powerful means of extracting information not meant for the
outside world, and is effective at obtaining encryption keys from a variety of systems. SIMs
have a number of countermeasures in place to prevent leakage of protected information
through these side channels, but few documented attempts at attacking the PIN exist,
leaving side-channel analysis as a potential means of PIN extraction.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the performance of side-
channel analysis attacks applied to SIM cards. First, the problem definition, goals and
hypothesis, and high-level experimental approach are discussed in Section 3.2. The side-
channel analysis process is defined and bounded as a system in Section 3.3. Next, the
problem is defined in terms of services provided for a workload in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
Expected outcomes are described as metrics in Section 3.6. Factors and parameters are
discussed in Sections 3.8 and 3.7, respectively. A complete description of the equipment
used, experimental setup, and evaluation process is presented in Section 3.9. Finally, the
experimental design is covered in Section 3.10.
3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The ultimate goal of this research is to develop a functional electromagnetic side-
channel attack against a SIM card. Verified, consistent correlation of captured EM data
with stored PIN values enables the construction of a side-channel analysis system to be used
against arbitrary SIM cards (within the subset of makes and models tested). A successful
system can repeatably recover an unknown SIM card’s PIN.
Additionally, this research evaluates the effectiveness and impact of manufacturer
countermeasures against SCA attacks. Since side-channel attacks are well-known in
the field, specific protections are in place on most cards to protect against information
leakage. These protections or countermeasures are typically designed to obscure the card’s
cryptographic operations as opposed to the PIN. The efficacy of such methods in protecting
the PIN is shown by this work.
30
Finally, this research tests existing collection techniques, SCA attacks, and correlation
techniques against a SIM card PIN application. The reproducible result of unlocking a SIM
with an unknown PIN validates this use of the selected methods of SCA.
The working hypothesis for this research is that electromagnetic side-channel analysis
methods can successfully identify the PIN (or PUK) of a locked SIM.
3.2.2 Approach.
At a high level, the approach is divided into two phases, each of which is repeated
with various combinations of factors as explained in subsequent sections. The first phase is
known as the “training” phase. A given SIM is placed in the test apparatus for evaluation
under a given set of parameters. The data from this collection is evaluated to observe
necessary correlations. Given that the card is deemed “leaky” enough and the collection
method is found to produce useful data, a second and more in-depth collection is taken.
It is expected that, in a production system, this training process is repeated for each new
make and model (and likely revision) of SIM presented to the system. This training enables
the system to recognize the card’s discrete states and the data passing through its internal
components.
Given that the first phase is successful, that is, usable training data is collected, a
second phase is executed. A representative unknown PIN card is presented to the system
and evaluated using the same apparatus as in the first phase. This simulates an operational
perspective: the use of SCA techniques to break an unknown card. A comparatively small
collection is taken from the card such that its retry limits are not exceeded (either two or
nine tries to attack the PIN or PUK, respectively). Finally, a correlation algorithm classifies
the dataset and determines the most likely stored PIN.
Attacks carried out are all electromagnetically based, but the correlation work is
performed by power analysis algorithms as shown in [39].
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3.3 System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT) is the SIM Side-Channel Analysis System, a combination
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and custom-developed components assembled to
automate much of the side-channel attack process. At the highest level, the SUT
encompasses the SIM card itself, the process automation and data collection system, and
the correlation and classification system as shown in Figure 3.1. The focus of the work is on
the development and manipulation of the latter two components, although factors affecting
all three are varied throughout the process. While the SIM itself is part of the system under
test, variations in card make, model, and stored PIN code are all considered part of the
workload.
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Figure 3.1: SIM Side-Channel Analysis System (SUT)
This research does not consider other types of smart cards or identity modules,
although it could be adapted to do so. Many other smart card-based authentication systems
use a PIN code and would be ideal candidates for further research. Additionally, the system
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only considers leakages acquired and analyzed through electromagnetic analysis; other
forms of side-channel leakage, while potentially interesting, are not considered.
3.4 System Services
The primary service provided by the SIM Side-Channel Analysis System is the
recovery of unknown PINs. The service requires captured data from the Data Collection
component whitch implicitly includes the desired unknown PIN (whether or not the PIN is
recoverable). The processing of this data is completed by the Correlation and Classification
component, which is used to provide the final results. Provided that sufficient correlation
is found to make correlation and classification decisions, the output of the service is one of
the following:
• Complete PIN found – the best case scenario; the PIN has been found and all digits
are correct.
• Partial PIN found – not enough correlation to identify all digits, but others are known.
• PIN not found – not enough correlation for any digit to be determined consistently.
• PIN/PUK lockout – the card is locked because the retry count has been reached.
The Data Collection component provides captured data to the Correlation and
Classification component. The outcome is simply the requested data, if it exists.
The SIM provides a number of services to a cellular device as discussed in Chapter 2.
In the bounds of this research, however, it simply provides a communication interface to
validate PIN codes. Its outcomes consist of the following:
• PIN good – the provided PIN matches the stored PIN
• PIN bad – the provided PIN does not match the stored PIN
• PIN lockout – the retry limit was reached and further PINs will not be validated
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3.5 Workload
The workload of the SIM Side-Channel Analysis System consist of SIMs along with
their unknown PINs. Each workload “unit” – that is, a single SIM with an unknown PIN –
is processed individually, so there is no concept of workload throughput.
There are two workload parameters, both of which affect the performance of the
system. The first of these is the make and model of SIM. Card features, implementation
details, and manufacturing differences are all likely to affect the SCA process and therefore
must be considered as a parameter. Note that in this research, any given unique make and
model pair is considered independent from any other make-model pair. As multiple SIMs
may share chipsets, cell-level components, or electromagnetic signatures, the examination
of similarities and differences between SIMs of same and different manufacturers is a topic
for future research.
The second workload parameter is the value of the stored PIN itself. Due to differences
in current consumption between a bit being set or cleared – some of the principles the EMA
process relies on – the captured trace data will differ based on the value of each PIN digit.
Depending on countermeasures and architecture design, certain PIN codes are more likely
to be detectable than others, thus, this parameter is likely to affect workload results.
3.6 Performance Metrics
Performance of the system is measured primarily against the desired output
classification. The possible results are fourfold, and as such, percentages for the following
four result categories are desired:
• Complete PIN found
• Partial PIN found
• PIN not found
• PIN/PUK lockout
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Judging between these results, it is easy to ascertain the effectiveness of the technique
as the metrics correlate directly. It is intuitively apparent that the desired outcome is for the
“complete PIN found” percentage to be the highest. However, the remaining percentages
remain useful, as they help identify partial successes and may guide assisted brute forcing.
The success metric is also ranked in terms of workload parameters. Since these
workload parameters affect the system’s operation, they have an effect on the output and
must be observed. This ranking helps to determine, for example, collection techniques that
are more effective at higher trace counts versus those effective at lower counts.
3.7 System Parameters
Since this research deals with a SIM card outside of its normal operational
environment – that is, the SIM is attached to the experimental apparatus apart from a
cellular phone), many of the normal operational parameters (such as battery power, radio
frequency environment, and frequent communication with the phone) are removed from
study. However, the overall SUT has several parameters of note.
The first of these is the filter frequency. Since EMA captures electromagnetic
frequencies, noise is a large problem that must be dealt with. The first line of defense
apart from the physical probe shield is in-line filtering. A well-selected filter will exclude
frequencies outside of those produced by the card in normal operation and only allow
desirable data to pass into the collection system. The selection of this range, or passband, is
highly important, as an incorrectly centered or overly narrow passband will filter out useful
leakage information.
Another parameter is the number of traces captured. Many traces must be captured to
average out noise, transients, and the like. A large number of traces results in impractical
amounts of data for analysis; additionally, a real-world SIM application is useless unless
the number of required collections does not exceed the retry limit. However, too few trace
collections will not produce a useful level of correlation.
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Finally, the selection of a capture technique is important. The mechanical layout and
structure of a given SIM as well as the use of shielding determines the location and direction
of information leakage. By capturing from the top and bottom of the SIM as well as from
both directions together in a novel noise cancellation technique, the chance is higher that
one of these methods finds usable leakage. Capturing in additional planes (such as from the
sides) as well as at varying angles is a viable technique for future work, although it requires
the use of a more dextrous positioning assembly such as a robotic arm.
3.8 Factors
The following factors are selected out of the given workload and system parameters to
provide the best results given the least number of experiments. Parameters not listed here,
such as filter frequency and card make and model, are set at a constant level throughout all
experiments. Factors are summarized in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Factors and Levels
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Collection Technique Top Bottom Dual
Number of traces 10 1,000 25,000
The number of traces collected is a very influential factor in the experiments as
discussed earlier. Levels of 10, 1,000, and 25,000 are chosen to more fully evaluate other
factors. Collecting 25,000 traces initially provides a platform in which even small levels
of correlation can likely be determined. This is necessary for the training stage and a
correlation and classification system that captures no correlation at this high number of
traces can be discarded. A level of 10 traces tests performance near real-world levels, as
useful extraction of a PIN or PUK requires a number of traces less than the lock-out counter
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(two traces for the PIN, nine traces for the PUK). A collection of 1,000 traces is chosen as
an intermediate value between those discussed previously.
In addition to the number of traces, the collection technique is varied among three
levels. Collection from the top of the card is the traditional collection method and is also the
simplest. Collection from the bottom possibly provides some benefit if the top of the die is
covered by a shield mesh. However, the bottom of the die is covered by the SIM’s interface
contacts; specifically, the center ground terminal blocks the entirety of the die area. Unlike
a chip encapsulant, however, the contact terminal is a thin layer of metal that is easily
removed by mechanical scraping with a razor blade. Once the metal layer is removed,
signal levels meet or exceed those found on the top, making bottom collection feasible and
not overly invasive. Finally, the dual-probe top and bottom collection method is designed
to lessen noise generated by the card itself, specifically that which is intentionally created
as a side-channel attack countermeasure. This method is discussed in further detail in the
following section.
3.9 Evaluation Technique
Results are obtained via measurement of real systems (instead of simulated data).
Since the SCA technique relies on real-world leakage and manufacturing differences,
simulation or modeling would be difficult and would provide unrealistic results of minimal
utility. Additionally, SIM cards are readily available at low cost, interfacing specifications
are well-documented, and the necessary equipment is on hand.
3.9.1 Component description.
3.9.1.1 SIM interface.
The first component of the measurement system is a custom SIM interface printed
circuit board (PCB), shown in Figure 3.2. The PCB contains a SIM socket, a level-
translating interface device, a high-precision crystal oscillator, and a clock buffer. The
SIM socket provides simple mechanical and electrical connections to the SIM to hold it in
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a steady, consistent position and to connect it to the rest of the circuit for communication
and power. The level-translating chip buffers the SIM communication and translates it to
the appropriate levels. Additionally, the chip provides SIM power-up sequencing, as SIMs
require each pin to be activated in a sequential manner to begin communication. Finally, the
crystal oscillator provides a stable and accurate clock signal to the SIM via the clock buffer.
As collection data is analyzed for spectral content, the SIM must be clocked correctly at all
times to ensure the accuracy of the observations. The SIM interface board is powered by a
standard voltage-regulated laboratory power supply set to 3.3 volts.
Figure 3.2: SIM interface board
3.9.1.2 FPGA controller.
Next, a Sasebo GII field-programmable gate array (FPGA) development board is used
to perform SIM commands and provide a serial interface to the PC. The board features two
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FPGAs, but only the Xilinx Virtex 5 chip is used in this work. The FPGA’s logic (written
originally in VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) code) receives commands
from the PC and forwards them on to the SIM. In addition, the FPGA plays a critical
timing role by generating a trigger signal to start and stop the capture of analog probe data.
Since the exact time of PIN validation is unknown, the trigger must be wide enough (in
the time domain) to guarantee that the capture period includes this comparison. Custom
UART logic on the FPGA activates the trigger at the exact moment that the last bit of the
PIN verification command is sent. As soon as the first bit of the SIM is received, the trigger
is deactivated.
3.9.1.3 EM probe.
The next component is the data collection probe. A Riscure low-sensitivity (LS) EM
probe is used to collect electromagnetic emanations from the SIM via electromagnetic
coupling. Along with the collection coil, the probe contains a low-noise amplifier (LNA)
to raise the level of the signal as close as possible to the source. The LNA is powered
by a standard voltage-regulated laboratory power supply set to 5.0 volts. All collections
are performed with the probe’s shield in the down position to minimize noise from other
sources (both from the SIM as well as environmental noise sources).
3.9.1.4 XYZ stage.
A Riscure XYZ stage is used to automate the precise positioning of the probe. The
stage consists of a mounting block to hold an EM probe and a set of sliding rail mechanisms
to give the probe three degrees of freedom. The movement of each rail is enabled by a
stepper motor connected to a screw drive. A controller unit drives each of the motors and
tracks their position such that the probe can be moved to an arbitrary 3D location based
on commands sent to the controller’s serial port. Typically, the X and Y axes are used to
position the probe on the 2D surface plane of the SIM; the Z axis is set initially to achieve
minimum probe-to-SIM clearance and is held constant for all experiments.
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3.9.1.5 Oscilloscope.
A LeCroy WavePro 725Zi digital storage oscilloscope capable of 40 gigasamples per
second measures and stores the analog signal from the electromagnetic probe. A second
channel of the scope captures the external trigger signal used to initiate each data capture.
The unit is controlled by the PC via an Ethernet connection to set capture parameters and
download captured signal data. The oscilloscope is running the Microsoft Windows Vista
Business SP1 operating system.
3.9.1.6 Collection and analysis PC.
Finally, a PC receives collected data from the oscilloscope, controls the XYZ stage,
and communicates with the SIM via the FPGA board. The PC is also used to analyze
the data post-capture. The PC is a Dell Precision T7500 workstation with two 2.0GHz
Xeon E5504 processors and 48GB of RAM. All experiments are performed under the
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 operating system. Relevant software running on the
PC includes MATLAB version 2012b as well as Riscure Inspector version 4.4. MATLAB
scripts perform all control operations for the SIM, oscilloscope, and XYZ stage. Inspector
is used for manual data viewing and visual analysis. It also generates the signal strength
plot from collected XY scan data.
3.9.2 Component connections.
The configuration of component interconnections is shown in Figure 3.3 and described
below.
The SIM connects to the interface board via a socket which provides communication,
a clock signal, a reset signal, and power. The SIM interface board connects to the FPGA
board via wire leads for communication and signaling. The trigger signal connects to a
standard oscilloscope probe, which in turn connects to the oscilloscope. The interface
board is powered by a standard laboratory power supply.
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Figure 3.3: Component connections
The FPGA board is connected to a USB-to-serial adapter for communication, which
in turn connects to a standard powered USB hub. A second USB cable is used to provide
power to the FPGA. For programming, a Xilinx Platform Cable USB programming adapter
is connected to the FPGA board’s Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) port. The programming
adapter then connects to the USB hub for communication.
Each XYZ stage connects to a USB-to-serial adapter for communication, which in
turn connects to the USB hub. The stages each have their own 24V power supply.
Each Riscure EM probe connects to the oscilloscope via a Bayonet Neill-Concelman
(BNC) cable. Filters are connected in-line between the BNC cable and the oscilloscope.
The probes each connect to the laboratory power supply.
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The oscilloscope receives the signals from the two probes on channels 1 and 2.
The trigger signal received from the FPGA via a probe is connected to channel 3. The
oscilloscope connects to the PC via a direct Ethernet connection.
The laboratory power supply is connected to each probe’s LNA (5.0V) as well as the
SIM interface board (3.3V).
The PC is connected to the USB hub for communication with the FPGA, XYZ stages,
and the FPGA programming adapter. It is also connected directly to the oscilloscope via
Ethernet.
3.9.3 Experimental process.
The experimental process follows the approach in Section 3.2.2 closely. First, a test
SIM is chosen and exploratory data analysis is performed by executing an XY scan of
the device. This scan records the signal strength at each location in a grid of locations
across the die surface of the SIM. Typical scan dimensions are 20x20 or 30x30, resulting
in 400 and 900 collections, respectively. As the probe moves to each location, a known-
good PIN is validated and the oscilloscope is triggered to capture the data. When the
capture is complete, the Inspector software is used to display the scan results in the form
of a representative signal strength level at each location. The optimum capture location is
determined visually from analysis of these results while adjusting a software bandpass filter
to hone in on the expected frequency. When the capture location is chosen, its coordinates
are recorded and the XYZ stage moves the probe to this location.
The training phase now begins by manually setting the SIM to a fixed PIN. Next,
the automated process begins as controlled by MATLAB. A large, random selection of
invalid PIN codes are then presented to the card, alternating each time with the (known)
correct PIN to reset the retry counter. The probe and oscilloscope capture each invalid
attempt as triggered by the FPGA. A MATLAB script requests each capture’s data from
the oscilloscope and saves it to a local file on the PC. Each individual capture record also
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stores the attempted PIN. After initial visual inspection for alignment, MATLAB scripts
process the data in a manner specific to the chosen correlation algorithm.
For the PIN recovery phase, a capture technique is chosen and the SIM is set to an
“unknown” PIN. The attempt-and-collect process is repeated n − 1 times, where n is the
number of attempts remaining on the retry counter. A random PIN is used each time,
and the retry counter is not reset, since the correct PIN is “unknown.” Once the last retry
value is reached, the correlation algorithm computes the most likely correct PIN based
on the collected data. Finally, this guessed PIN is sent to the SIM for validation and the
result recorded. Results are validated by the SIM’s response to the validation command.
Alternately, to prevent accidental card lock-out, this final validation step may be performed
by comparing the guessed PIN to the recorded “unknown” PIN rather than sending it to the
SIM for verification. This method of validation is equally effective as no electromagnetic
data collection is performed during the final validation – the goal is simply to determine
the correctness of the guessed PIN.
3.10 Experimental Design
Given the selected factors listed in Section 3.8, a full factorial design is feasible and
gives the best representation of the effects of changing factors. There are two factors
with three levels specified for each, giving 3 × 3 = 9 experimental configurations.
Each experiment is repeated five times to establish results independent of the noisy
electromagnetic environment. This gives a total of 9 × 5 = 45 experiments.
3.11 Methodology Summary
A methodology is presented to identify, capture, and exploit electromagnetic
emanations of SIM cards during PIN verification. The process consists of a training or
learning phase as well as an execution phase. The process is preceded by exploratory
data analysis to ensure the appropriate leakage is found. Appropriate factors are varied
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to examine the results of differing trace counts and collection methods. An experimental
equipment setup is described to control the SIM and perform the necessary collection and
analysis. Finally, a full-factorial experimental design is proposed resulting in a total of 45
experiments.
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IV. Results
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the results of executing the methodology described
in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 discusses assumptions made and parameters held at fixed values
throughout the experiments. Section 4.3 describes the output of the experiments. Section
4.4 presents an analysis of these results and summarizes the outcome.
4.2 Fixed Values and Assumptions
Before the discussing experimental results, it is important to note a number of
assumptions made and fixed values chosen.
4.2.1 SIM selection.
Initially, the intent was to test a variety of SIM makes and models against this
methodology. Cards from Gemalto, Oberthur, Infineon, and STMicroelectronics were
obtained and tested. However, limitations in the custom UART design, variations in SIM
communication protocols and timing, and the author’s limited experience in VHDL all
contributed to difficulty in reliably interfacing with multiple models of SIMs. As such, a
single representative SIM was chosen and development effort was focused on obtaining
reliable and consistent communication with that particular SIM.
The SIM chosen is an AT&T-branded standard-size (2FF) SIM. The AT&T branding
is chosen due to the company being the largest GSM-based network provider in the United
States, thus, representing one of the greatest SIM card distributions in the country. The SIM
is readily available at low cost (around $3.00) and is compatible with GSM, UMTS, and
LTE networks. Available since at least 2010, the security features, manufacturing process,
and architecture of this SIM are thought to be representative of most modern SIMs.
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Unfortunately, information on the manufacturer, model, and chipset information is
difficult to locate for most SIMs, and cards are often labeled only with a carrier part number.
AT&T does not publish the specifications for this particular part number. However, multiple
unofficial sources associate the part number and unique contact pad layout with Infineon
(the chipset/CPU manufacturer) and Gemalto (the integrator and card manufacturer) [21],
[20], [17]. Thus, SCA countermeasures known to be used by Infineon are thought to be
present in this device.
4.2.2 Clock assumptions.
As discussed earlier, it is necessary to filter the input signal to lessen electromagnetic
noise picked up by the EM probe and any components between the probe coil and the
oscilloscope (including the cable, LNA, etc.). The source clock signal provided to the SIM
by the interface board is a 4 MHz square wave, so the SIM CPU is first assumed to operate
at a clock rate of 4 MHz. The chosen filter must allow this frequency to pass; as an 11 MHz
low-pass filter is the closest value found on-hand, it is selected and affixed.
A front-side (top-of-die) collection is taken starting with the SIM at idle and
continuing through a PIN verification command. The resulting signal is shown in Figure
4.1.
Figure 4.1: Macro-level trace overview (front side)
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The structured nature of the signal and the lower levels observed at idle are good
indications that the captured signal is associated with CPU activity. A power spectral
density (PSD) analysis of the same collection (Figure 4.2) shows that the strongest
frequency component of the signal is located at 4 MHz, which further supports that
conjecture.
Figure 4.2: Unnormalized PSD analysis
The oscilloscope’s sampling rate must be configured to accurately capture data at
these frequencies. While the selected oscilloscope is capable of 40 gigasamples per second
(GS/s), capturing at that rate produces an inordinate amount of unnecessarily detailed data,
increasing processing time and storage requirements. Instead, the sampling rate is reduced
by an order of magnitude into the megasamples per second (MS/s) range. If the input
signal to the scope is band-limited to 11 MHz ( f ), the Nyquist sampling theorem suggests
that sampling can theoretically be performed at 22 MS/s (2 f , the Nyquist rate) without
losing sinusoidal frequency information. However, to avoid aliasing, the sampling rate is
arbitrarily chosen to be double the Nyquist rate, or 44 MS/s. The closest sampling rate
settings the oscilloscope provides are 25 MS/s and 50 MS/s, so the higher rate is chosen
and the sampling rate is fixed at fs = 50 MS/s. Note that this rate is over six times the
Nyquist rate of the signal of interest ( f = 4 MHz, Nyquist = 2 f = 8 MS/s).
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4.3 Experimental Output
4.3.1 XY surface PSD scans.
The result of an XY surface scan of the device follows in Figure 4.3. Each plot
shows the average PSD energy level for the selected frequency band at each physical
location on the die. Note that each plot is dynamically scaled (normalized) and thus
direct intensity comparisons cannot be made between plots. Scan dimensions are 30x30
measurements, with the extrema being defined by the locations where the probe is centered
on the respective die edge. The trigger is timed from the FPGA’s transmission of the last
bit of the PIN verification command to the detection of the first bit of the response returning
from the SIM.
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Figure 4.3: Initial unfiltered XY scan of SIM front (left plot) and back (right plot).
After applying a narrow-band software filter (in addition to the 11 MHz low-pass
hardware filter) to only pass the desired 4 MHz signal, the XY plots appear as shown in
Figure 4.4. On each side, the location with the strongest signal level is chosen as the capture
location.
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Figure 4.4: 4 MHz filtered XY scan of front (left plot) and back (right plot).
4.3.2 Initial analysis.
Next, collections are taken from each probe at the 25,000 trace level. The highest level
is chosen as the high number of traces, while slower to work with, are likely to provide the
strongest correlation due to the sheer amount of data. These collections could have been
performed simultaneously as the test setup allowed the front and back probes to move
independent of each other and the SIM location. However, for the sake of development
time, front and back collections are taken independently. Results shown are from back-side
collections; front-side collection results are essentially identical but contain more noise.
Initial analysis shows the macro-level operation of the PIN verification (shown in
Figure 4.5) is as follows.
Immediately, the instruction dependency is visible. The high-level functionality
is very apparent and is consistent among each repetition. First, the trailing UART
communication from the FPGA to the SIM is seen. Next, the verification process (the
details of which are unknown) is apparently repeated three times. Each repetition is
approximately 3 milliseconds (ms) long. Following the three repeated processes, another
UART communication period is seen, this time from the SIM to the FPGA (the SIM’s
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Figure 4.5: Macro-level trace overview (back side)
response to the PIN validation). Afterwards, the SIM enters what appears to be an idle
state, where it remains for the rest of the capture period.
The trigger signal (not shown) from the FPGA to the oscilloscope is fired at
approximately the 5 ms mark and is deactivated at 14 ms. This 9 ms period is the entire
time between command and response, so the PIN verification must take place inside this
window. If the SIM is presumed to be running at a clock rate of 4 MHz, this window
contains approximately 36,000 clock cycles.
Observing the signal’s PSD plot in Figure 4.2, the source clock signal is visible as
a 4 MHz pulse along with several of its harmonics at 8 MHz and so on. This provides a
“sanity check” that the emanations of the SIM are being captured. A spectral analysis is
also conducted with Inspector, which uses the PSD (calculated from the discrete Fourier
transform as |DFT|2) to display the signal’s representation in the frequency domain. Here,
peaks are also present at 4 MHz and subsequent harmonics. There are various smaller
peaks but the dominating frequency is the 4 MHz clock. The rolloff of the 11 MHz filter is
also apparent.
Observation at this 4 MHz level shows that clock pulses are reasonably well aligned
at this point. Unfortunately, some of the larger features are not, a potential side effect
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of capturing such a large (and long) window. It does not appear that random clocking is
occurring, as the observed clock signal maintains alignment throughout the different traces.
4.3.3 Standard attacks.
Before any attacks are performed, the SIM’s PIN is manually set to the value 1111.
All tests are conducted with the value 111x, that is, the first four digits are correct while
the fourth digit is varied randomly. As discussed in the methodology, the key value used
is attached to the metadata of each trace so that it can be used as the plaintext input to the
DPA attack later on.
An initial analysis is conducted by partitioning the data by the incorrect key guess.
This results in ten groups based on the value of the fourth digit of the attempted PIN (0-9).
A visual comparison of traces is performed to look for similarities. While the same macro
structure is observed among the traces, many smaller areas appear to vary substantially
even when the attempted PIN is the same. Figure 4.6 shows a zoomed area of interest
in a singe trace for which the PIN guess is 1110. Figure 4.7 shows a composite of 100
traces of the same PIN guess (1110) zoomed to the same area as in Figure 4.6. These two
traces are aligned temporally (based on the signal increase when processing begins), but
the identifiable “spike” changes in location and intensity with each collection, as do the
smaller features closer to the noise floor.
Next, a difference of means test is conducted to attempt to cancel out some of the noise.
Each PIN value group contains approximately 2,500 traces, at which point random noise
should approach an average of zero effect. As an example comparison, the mean traces
of PIN attempts 1110 and 1117 are shown in Figure 4.8. These values were particularly
chosen as the Hamming weights are the furthest apart (the last digit of 1110, encoded as
0x30, has a Hamming weight of 2; the last digit of 1117, encoded as 0x37, has a Hamming
weight of 5). Unfortunately, the differences are not consistent, and subsequent collections
rank the different PIN groups differently. Figure 4.8 shows a representative zoomed region
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Figure 4.6: Zoomed section of trace with PIN guess 1110
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Figure 4.7: Zoomed composite section of 100 traces with PIN guess 1110
of the inconsistent and noisy result – very little correlation is visible. Plots comparing the
remaining PIN guesses appear similarly inconsistent.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of means, 200 traces: PIN guess 1110 and PIN guess 1117
Although visual analysis did not reveal any obvious details, further analysis is
conducted to ensure data is not hiding below what is visible by the naked eye. Simple
electromagnetic analysis is the first attack attempted. First, all traces are compared via a
standard deviation plot. If SPA is viable, an obvious instruction-level correlation should
exist, and differences should “pop out.” This plot comparing all traces is shown in
Figure 4.9. Additionally, the average of many traces with a given PIN should not differ
substantially from any single trace. This is shown by plotting the standard deviation of
only traces with a single PIN guess (1110) as shown in Figure 4.10.
Substantial differences appear in both plots, and the peaks in the same locations
indicate little difference in signal variation as a result of a data dependency. A fair amount
of noise is present as well. The standard deviation of the noise present in the idle state
is measured at approximately 35 millivolts (mV) peak-to-peak and disappears when the
SIM is removed from the measurement apparatus, which indicates that the SIM itself is
the source of this noise. Possible sources for this noise include the SIM’s internal power
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Figure 4.9: Standard deviation, 1000 traces: All PIN guesses 1110-1119
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Figure 4.10: Standard deviation, 100 traces: PIN guess 1110
supply, clock manager, or routine operating system tasks. The noise could also be coupled
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from the external power source. Alternately, the source could be a noise generator present
on the SIM as an SCA countermeasure.
Next, a DPA attack is attempted. Unfortunately, DPA requires a model in which an
intermediate state for a given plaintext is known. In this case, encryption is not explicitly
taking place, although it is likely that encryption or hashing is occurring internally to
compare the input PIN to a stored encrypted/hashed PIN. However, no knowledge of
this algorithm is given, so the attack is conducted with the assumption that a standard
comparison is used. A common instruction used by processors to perform a comparison is
to exclusive OR (XOR) two values together, so XOR is chosen as the operator for the DPA
function. The collected 25,000 trace set is used and a DPA attack is performed using key
guesses 0 through 9 (encoded as 0x30 through 0x39), as it is known that these are the only
plaintext values used.
The DPA guess correlation plot for the fourth (varied) byte is shown in Figure 4.11.
Unfortunately, the plot does not provide promising results. There are no significant peaks,
and even if the maximum peak value is selected, the chosen peak is not substantially greater
than the noise level. The correlation value never exceeds 0.15 (a value of 1 indicates perfect
correlation). Subsequent runs of the collection process (with data captured in the exact
same manner) produce different key guesses every time.
If correlation was found for a given key guess, a large correlation spike would be
shown at the key’s location in the plot, along with possibly a few false spikes. However, no
obvious outliers exist here as no correlation level is substantially above the “noise floor” of
the curve. There are a number of reasons this may have failed, but the most likely reason is
the lack of architectural knowledge. This test assumes a simple XOR is used to perform the
PIN comparison, but PIN encryption or a more obfuscated comparison could completely
invalidate that hypothesis with trivial effort. Further hypotheses could be tested blindly, but
more analysis to determine any details of the algorithm in use is a stronger approach.
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Figure 4.11: Correlation plot for DPA (modified byte)
4.3.4 Noise cancellation.
As noise (either from a lack of leakage or due to SCA countermeasures) appears to be a
problem, a novel dual-probe approach is presented as a means of removing the noise. This
process is based on a noise cancellation technique used in the field of audio production
and processing. In an environment containing large amounts of background noise, two
microphones are often used to function as a noise-canceling pair. One microphone captures
the subject speaking along with the background noise, while the other microphone is turned
in order to capture only the noise. The noise signal is then subtracted from the speaker’s
voice signal, resulting in cleaner noise-reduced audio.
This principle is used here in electromagnetic analysis application. First, the
assumption is made that the active noise generator device contributes noise to the system in
an additive fashion. System leakage A is corrupted by noise source B to produce collected
EM signal C, trivially represented A + B = C. A single probe detects C and captures it, but
the corruption due to noise makes the signal unusable for EMA.
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Now, suppose that noise source B is collected separately by a second probe. If the
cross-sectional area of the probe coil is small enough to collect only the generated noise and
not the surrounding signals, C can then be processed by subtracting B in post-processing
or in real-time by the oscilloscope. The resulting signal C − B is the original A, no longer
corrupted by noise. The key to success is finding the location where noise is generated, and
capturing that signal in as isolated a fashion as possible.
To accomplish this, the second probe is positioned on the opposite side of the device
from the first probe (i.e., pointed towards top surface of the die instead of the bottom
surface) so as to provide maximum flexibility in locating the noise source. An XY scan
is conducted to locate sources of noise generation during the desired operation. Depending
on noise generator implementation, this source could be located in a separate circuit on the
die, or it could be found in the active shield’s connection to the rest of the circuit. Either
way, once the noise source is located, it must be recorded or added to the source signal
in real time. Note that if the same model probe is used as on the top side of the die, the
signal is already inverted with respect to the result C (as the physical inversion of the probe
causes the coil to be wound in the opposite direction relative to the other probe) and must
be added instead of subtracted.
In this particular implementation, this dual-probe method did not succeed. Skew was a
constant issue as it was difficult to get the two signals temporally calibrated together, even
when a reference clock signal was used for initial calibration. Slight movements of the
probe caused the signals to drift out of synchronization once again, making the use of this
method in an attack impractical for the time being. A sample well-aligned trace is shown
in Figure 4.12 (the “Difference” trace is the result).
Despite the lack of complete success, the subtraction does appear to lessen noise in the
source signal. This method holds promise for future research and should be studied under
more carefully controlled conditions and on additional SIM and smart card configurations.
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Figure 4.12: Illustration of background noise canceling process
4.4 Result Analysis
All experiments shown above are repeated at least five times for each of the different
trace count levels as discussed in the methodology. As expected, capturing fewer traces
increases the noise level and the resulting data has less utility than the 25,000-trace
collections shown above. EMA is shown to be ineffective for PIN recovery given the
selected parameters and assumptions, but future work can vary these values further and
may result in more information leakage. Unfortunately, these results are inconclusive.
However, while the EM data does not exhibit a strong data dependency, the SIM does show
a strong operation dependency, that is, the macro level operation of the PIN validation is
clearly and consistently visible.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presents an overall summary of the research conclusions, lessons learned,
and future work opportunities. Section 5.1 summarizes the analysis of the results described
in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 considers lessons learned throughout this research. Finally,
Section 5.3 describes future research opportunities based on this work.
5.1 Research Conclusions
The results of using electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis to observe a SIM card
PIN are inconclusive. A simple electromagnetic analysis attack presented too much noise
to identify any meaningful differences resulting from different PIN codes. A naı¨ve attempt
at differential analysis operating on the same data produced similar results, but the lack of
architectural knowledge prevented the use of an informed attack on whatever encryption
algorithm is used.
One of the largest factors contributing to the result was a lack of understanding
of the PIN validation algorithm. Unlike encryption algorithms, which are well-known,
documented, and can be studied outside of the device, the PIN validation algorithm used
by any given card is completely unknown and is truly a “black box.” In addition, the three-
or ten-attempt limits greatly hinder attacks that typically require tens if not hundreds of
traces.
Another factor is the lack of countermeasure information. In every card studied (prior
to limiting the EMA attacks to a single card), the type of countermeasures employed was
unknown. Mere knowledge of the existence of a countermeasure (without implementation
details) would be enough to devise a workaround, but without even that information, it is
difficult to know what to look for. For example, if the card was known to insert random
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NOP instructions into the execution pipeline, these could be identified and removed in
post-processing of the data.
While no data-dependent leakage was found, the card’s EM response clearly indicated
that a PIN code was being evaluated, as the EM signature of the validation operation was
consistently visible to the naked eye after only a single trace was taken. It is possible that
this information could lead to other attacks on SIMs and other smart cards, since at least in
this case, the internal operation was not completely hidden.
The results of this research have little standalone impact, but the methodology, code,
circuits and results can be used in future work to further evaluate the concepts studied here.
5.2 Lessons Learned
Many lessons about black-box analysis were learned over the course of conducting
this research. There were many times in the process of this research where much time was
lost by following a path based on an assumption that later turned out to be false. One of
these assumptions was made in the selection of a filter frequency. Early literature review
indicated that the SIM would operate at the supplied clock frequency internally; thus, a
relatively slow (4 MHz) clock was chosen and an 11 MHz low-pass filter installed into the
collection apparatus. It was not until the end of the research that this initial choice was
reconsidered and further clock frequencies were discovered higher in the spectrum. Due to
time constraints, a thorough analysis has not been conducted on these higher frequencies;
however, with what is now known about the SIM’s use of a PLL to obtain a higher CPU
frequency, it seems likely that greater information leakage would be found in these higher
bands.
Another lesson learned involved the use of side-channel analysis equipment. As the
probe equipment present in the laboratory was well-known to be of high quality, the use of
other probes was not considered. The probe coil only has a cross-sectional area of 1 mm2,
which was unable to provide a very detailed image of the tiny < 4 mm2 die. Despite
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this limitation and several time-consuming equipment-related problems with the probe,
research into another type of probe was never conducted. Recent research indicates that a
probe with much greater resolution can be constructed in an afternoon out of simple parts
readily available in the laboratory. Had this possibility been considered earlier, less time
would have been spent attempting to work around the probe limitations.
5.3 Future Work
Ideas for future work fall into two categories: those that continue this methodology
of extracting the PIN from a SIM, and those that may be more generally useful in side-
channel-related work.
5.3.1 SIM PIN work.
• Explore other frequencies. An assumption made from the beginning of the research
was that the SIM’s internal CPU clock was relatively low; thus, the input signal
was filtered as required to hone in on this signal. After removing the filter and
observing the spectrum in a fast Fourier transform (FFT) waterfall plot, several other
frequencies appear that are good candidates for the CPU frequency. Further research
should explore these frequencies and attempt the same EMA attacks at the most likely
spectral location. Additionally, the XY scan could be modified to show spectral
content at each physical location to better identify the different components (PLL,
power supply, CPU, etc.).
• High-resolution probe. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the resolution of the probe used
in this research (1 mm2) is very low compared to the SIM’s die size. Deutschmann
in [9] demonstrates a means of easily constructing high-resolution probes with very
impressive results (200µm and 50µm). A higher resolution probe would not only
allow more powerful focusing on key leakage locations, but it could also improve the
accuracy of the proposed dual-probe noise reduction technique.
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• Sinusoidal clock. Both the frequency- and time-domain plots of the electromagnetic
trace show many harmonics of the 4 MHz reference clock signal. Research suggests
that using a sinusoidal clock input rather than a square wave would likely cut down
on those harmonics and present a cleaner and more easily analyzed signal.
• Additional card makes/models. The make and model of SIM in this research
was limited to a single selection due to time and VHDL ability. Future research
should update the VHDL code to properly communicate with additional cards; if
communication with these other cards is made operational, it is possible that this
methodology would function as-is and perhaps even succeed with another SIM.
Additionally, many other smart-card-based authentication systems use a PIN code
for access and are potentially vulnerable to this type of attack.
• Baseline testing. Existing research on SIM PIN extraction developed code and ran
it on live SIMs for analysis [18] [14]. Future research should obtain a development
kit for a modern SIM equipped with countermeasures, develop SIM verification code
on it, and implement a working side-channel attack. This would result in a baseline
study of the effects the countermeasures actually have in the real world, and this
information could be used to strengthen the attack on existing SIMs.
• Counterfeit/malware detection. The SIM card tested in this research exhibits a
consistent pattern of electromagnetic leakage during the PIN verification process.
This pattern is consistent across multiple traces and is likely dependent on the
operations running on the SIM’s CPU. These patterns could be used as a signature
to ensure that a given SIM does not contain counterfeit or malicious code.
• Advanced XY scan. Current techniques to scan for EM emissions only operate in a
single plane. It may be possible to detect additional signals if the card is examined
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in additional planes (e.g., the sides of the card) or from alternate angles by attaching
the EM probe to an articulated robotic arm.
5.3.2 Related SCA work.
• Dual-probe approach. The dual-probe noise canceling approach discussed in this
research appears to be novel in this SCA application. Further analysis of the
dual probe approach is warranted and may be useful to reduce the effect of more
aggressive noise generation systems. Baseline testing of this method’s efficacy
should be performed against a known algorithm running on a SIM architecture known
to employ noise generation countermeasures.
• FM demodulation. Analysis of the FFT waterfall plot of the SIM’s spectral output
during PIN validation reveals an interesting signal in the 34 MHz range. The signal
varies in frequency over time, covering an approximately 1.5 MHz band. The
macro-level variation pattern seems consistent across multiple traces. One potential
use for this signal could be to correct a corresponding time-domain EM trace for
clock variation countermeasures. It may also be a side-channel leakage itself. An
interesting future research study would be to take a large collection, demodulate this
signal to convert it to the time domain, then apply standard DPA-type analysis to the
data.
5.4 Summary
In conclusion, the study on the side-channel susceptibility of SIM card PIN validation
routines to side-channel analysis attacks is inconclusive. This research demonstrates
that naı¨ve attempts at simple and differential electromagnetic analysis do not reveal the
PIN of the tested SIM, but it is unclear whether this is the direct result of intentional
hardware or software countermeasures or simply a side-effect of the validation algorithm’s
implementation. Despite the lack of PIN leakage, the SIM’s EM emanations do contain an
63
instruction dependency for the PIN validation. Recommendations include exploring higher
frequency bands and performing baseline testing with known SIM architectures. This
research provides results of known analysis techniques as well as a thorough methodology
for further study of additional SIMs and collection methods.
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